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ABSTRACT 
Not all statutes are created equal, even when equality is the purpose for 
their creation. Some statutes are instructive, designed to regulate conduct or 
apportion public funds. On the other hand, some statutes shape cultural 
values by aiming to eradicate unethical cultural norms. The second type of 
statute asserts a nation’s principles, defines its priorities in social policy, and 
represents the character it hopes to assume. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Education Amendments of 1972 represent a collection of the latter 
kind of statute. In fact, they were passed by Congress in order to obtain the 
lofty goal of equality for all American citizens.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed as an effort to take a step 
forward in upholding the importance of anti-discrimination in 
employment. As both statutory law and case law developed in the area of 
discrimination, the interplay of certain anti-discriminatory laws became 
unclear. This Note focuses on the tension that arises when two particular 
statutes—each pertaining to anti-discrimination—are interpreted to disrupt 
the full effect of the other, thus minimizing a plaintiff’s ability to seek 
damages under both statutes.  
Title VII, set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was designed to 
protect employees from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin in their place of employment. Title IX, set forth in the 
Education Amendments of 1972, protects students against discrimination 
based on sex in education programs that receive federal financial assistance. 
The goal of both statutes was to deter discrimination; however, Title VII 
focuses on a wide range of forms of discrimination in the workplace, while 
Title IX focuses only on sex discrimination in federally funded education 
program. Thus, when a federally funded educational institution 
discriminates against either a student or employee based on sex, the two 
statutes intersect. 
Some circuits have determined that a failure to satisfy Title VII’s 
administrative procedures should preempt a Title IX claim by the plaintiff 
on the same matter. Their reasoning is that Title VII’s tedious qualification 
requirements should not be circumvented. Other circuits do not allow the 
preemption based on the rationale that the legislative intent of the Civil 
Rights Act was not in favor of keeping plaintiffs from relief, but was, in fact, 
designed to effect exactly the opposite result.  
The two biggest problems with this circuit split—which has lasted over 
twenty years—are that (1) plaintiffs in circuits that support a Title VII 
preemption of Title IX are at a strategic disadvantage when pressing their 
case, and (2) many employers are uncertain about discrimination policies. 
This Note proposes that until the Supreme Court settles this circuit split in 
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favor of eliminating the preemption, courts should use a systematic 
approach, relying on clear legislative intent to construe the interplay 
between Title VII and Title IX against preemption. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Eight years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, Congress 
passed the Higher Education Amendments of 1972.1 Once case law 
extended the protections of Title IX to both employees and attendees of 
publicly funded educational programs, Title IX and Title VII inevitably 
intersected. Two questions then arose. First, can an employee of a federally 
funded education program with a sexual discrimination claim pursue a 
remedy under Title IX after failing to meet the procedural requirements of 
Title VII? Second, if a plaintiff does not satisfy the administrative 
requirements that accompany Title VII and is consequently denied a trial, 
can a plaintiff pursue the same claim under Title IX?  
The circuits are split as to the answer to this question, and they have been 
since 1995. Some circuits hold that Title VII preempts a claim under Title 
IX;2 others hold that Title VII does not preempt a Title IX claim.3 Those that 
argue for Title VII preemption are concerned that the tedious 
administrative procedures that have been carefully put in place to protect 
against frivolous claims would be circumvented if preemption did not 
occur.4  
Those who argue that Title VII should not preempt Title IX are usually 
concerned with preserving the constitutional right of plaintiffs to not be 
discriminated against, a right that may be violated even though a plaintiff’s 
claim may not satisfy the burdensome administrative requirements under a 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html (last modified April 2015). 
 2. The Second Circuit, Third Circuit, and some district courts have held in favor of 
preemption. See Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998) 
abrogated by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Pfeiffer by Pfeiffer v. 
Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) abrogated by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable 
Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); see, e.g., Canty v. Old Rochester Reg’l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 
2d 66, 76 (D. Mass. 1999); Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 914 F. Supp 643, 648 (D. Me. 1996). 
 3. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that Title IX does not preempt Title 
VII. See Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997); Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 
1996); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 240 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500-01 (M.D.N.C. 2002); 
Carroll K. v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).   
 4. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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Title VII claim.5 Unfortunately, this circuit split has resulted in a strategical 
disadvantage to plaintiffs in pro-preemption circuits. 
This Note will discuss the case law that developed the question of 
whether Title VII preempts Title IX when a plaintiff fails to satisfy Title VII 
requirements, but still wants to bring the claim under Title IX. This Note 
will provide a rationale for favoring the elimination of this preemption 
based on a framework of statutory construction, and propose that after over 
twenty years, the most rational solution to this circuit split (other than a 
Supreme Court decision) is a straightforward, working framework aimed at 
uncovering the legislative intent regarding the intersection of the two 
statutes. Sections One and Two will discuss the brief histories of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Higher Education Amendments of 1972, as well 
as the foundational cases that established the circuit split. Section Three will 
propose a straightforward method of statutory construction to resolve 
ambiguity at the intersection of the statutes. Section Four will examine the 
current methodology used by some circuits as compared to the proposed 
framework for statutory construction. Section Five will suggest that Title 
VII and Title IX fulfill their respective articulated legislative intents, thereby 
providing compelling justification for eliminating the Title VII preemption 
of Title IX.   
II. BACKGROUND: HOW THE MODERN-DAY TITLE VII AND TITLE IX 
CIRCUIT SPLIT WAS CREATED  
The Civil Rights Act was signed into law in 1964 by President Lyndon 
Johnson.6 The Act was a strong response to the anti-discrimination social 
                                                                                                                                      
 5. See Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 775 (M.D. Pa. 2016).   
 6. James Patterson, The Civil Rights Movement: Major Events and Legacies, THE GILDER 
LEHRMAN INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN HISTORY, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-
era/civil-rights-movement/essays/civil-rights-movement-major-events-and-legacies (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2017). When President Johnson signed the Act, he stated:  
Americans of every race and color have died in battle to protect our freedom. 
Americans of every race and color have worked to build a nation of widening 
opportunities. Now our generation of Americans has been called on to 
continue the unending search for justice within our own borders. We believe 
that all men are created equal. Yet many are denied equal treatment. We believe 
that all men have certain unalienable rights. Yet many Americans do not enjoy 
those rights. We believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of liberty. Yet 
millions are being deprived of those blessings--not because of their own 
failures, but because of the color of their skin. The reasons are deeply imbedded 
in history and tradition and the nature of man. We can understand--without 
rancor or hatred--how this all happened. But it cannot continue. Our 
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movement, which was led by Americans like John Lewis, Bayard Rustin, 
Gloria Richardson, and, of course, Martin Luther King, Jr. who stated that 
“[w]e are here—we are here because we are tired now.”7 This new social 
policy codified by Congress featured eleven titles that affected much change 
in the social fabric of the United States through reform in employment 
policies for public entities.8  Most importantly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
sought to end discrimination in public employment through provisions like 
Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.9  
The Civil Rights Act shaped the workplace and the public arena, and 
helped to redefine social policy in the United States with respect to 
discrimination.10 For example, it outlawed racial segregation in schools, 
unequal application of voter registration for public facilities, and 
employment discrimination in the workplace.11 About eight years later, 
Congress took yet another important step in its legislative effort to affect 
social anti-discriminatory policy by broadening the scope of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act to apply not only to federal government 
employees, but also state and local government employees, businesses with 
more than fifteen employees, and government-subsidized schools.12  
Title IX followed the enactment of Title VII under the Education 
Amendments of 1972. According to Indiana Senator Birch Bayh, a strong 
proponent for women’s rights in education, the amendment was important 
                                                                                                                                      
Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. The principles of our 
freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign tonight forbids it. 
Lyndon Johnson Signs Civil Rights Act of 1964, HISTORY (July 2, 1964), 
http://www.history.com/speeches/lyndon-johnson-signs-civil-rights-act-of-1964.  
 7. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 140 
(1988); accord PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/black-culture/explore/civil-rights-
leaders/#.WEHEs6IrKqA, (last visited Aug. 3, 2017). 
 8. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eeo_1972.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2017). 
 9. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eeo_1972.html; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 
2017). 
 10. Tamara Lytle, Title VII Changed the Face of the American Workplace, SOCIETY FOR 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (May 21, 2014), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-
magazine/pages/title-vii-changed-the-face-of-the-american-workplace.aspx. 
 11. Id. 
 12. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eeo_1972.html, (last visited Aug. 20, 2017). 
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to provide “the women of America something that is rightfully theirs—an 
equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, to develop the skills they 
want, and to apply those skills with the knowledge that they will have a fair 
chance to secure the jobs of their choice.”13 President Nixon signed the bill 
in late June of 1972.14 
The goal of both statutes was to deter discrimination. Title VII focused 
on employment and Title IX focused on federally funded programs in 
education. When a federally funded educational institution discriminates 
against either a student or employee based on sex, the two statutes intersect. 
Consequently, a plaintiff could conceivably have a claim under either 
statute.  
When both statutes apply, some circuits have determined that a Title VII 
claim preempts a Title IX claim. The circuits reached this conclusion 
because a Title VII claim entails procedures that suggest a plaintiff should 
not be granted a court date without satisfying the administrative 
requirements.15  However, other circuits do not allow a Title VII claim to 
preempt a Title IX claim.16 
Three major cases developed this circuit split: Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, and 
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell. Each case demonstrates the 
Supreme Court’s straightforward approach to interpreting the statutes.17 
However, as straightforward as the Supreme Court’s individual 
interpretation of either Title VII or Title IX may be in each case, confusion 
still exists with respect to whether a plaintiff’s  failure to qualify under a 
Title VII claim should automatically abrogate his claim under Title IX.18 
Because the two statutes both serve to “penetrate deeply into American 
norms or institutional practice”19 and “successfully penetrate public 
normative and institutional culture in a deep way,”20 determining how the 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. Title IX Created Opportunities for Women, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 
http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/sept_oct_2012/titleIX.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2017). 
 14. Id.  
 15. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 16. See Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 773 (M.D. Pa. 2016).   
 17. See generally Lakoski, 66 F.3d 751.  
 18. Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX =?: Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy for 
Employment Discrimination in the Educational Sector, 5 CORNELL J.L. AND PUB. POL’Y 185 
(1996). 
 19. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 
(2001). 
 20. Id. 
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two interact could prove a profoundly suggestive commentary on American 
culture and institutional practice. 
A.   Cannon v. University of Chicago 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the petitioner alleged that she was 
denied entry into medical school because of her sex.21 Because the educational 
program at The University of Chicago received government funding, the 
petitioner’s claims fell within the scope of several statutes, including Title 
VI and Title IX.22 However, even though the petitioner qualified for relief 
under Title VI and Title IX, both the district and circuit court ruled 
adversely on both theories.23 Regarding Title IX, the district court granted 
the University’s motion to dismiss and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.24 In 
response to the adverse holdings, the plaintiff petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari specifically regarding the Title IX question.25  
On review, the Supreme Court stated that Title IX does not offer an 
implied right of private remedy.26 The Supreme Court considered the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in light of a legislative act that was passed shortly 
after the Seventh Circuit affirmed.27 The act, The Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, authorized an award of attorney’s fees to 
prevailing private parties in actions to enforce Title IX.28 In light of such an 
act, the Supreme Court carefully reconsidered the question of whether Title 
IX created an implied private action.29 After carefully considering a factor 
analysis created in a precedent case, Cort v. Ash,30 the Supreme Court 
determined that Congress intended to create a private cause of action for 
those harmed by the violation of a statute.31 It held that because the 
subsequent Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 statute was not 
intended to create a remedy that did not originally exist, Title IX impliedly 
gave rise to a private cause of action for those harmed by its violation.32 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 680 (1979). 
 22. Id. at 680, 684. 
 23. Id. at 680, 683-84. 
 24. Id. at 683. 
 25. Id. at 685-86. 
 26. Id. at 687-88. 
 27. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 685-86. 
 28. Id. at 685. 
 29. Id. at 685-86.  
 30. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 31. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688-89. 
 32. Id. at 688-89. 
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Therefore, even though Congress did not write Title IX with an express 
provision that provided aggrieved parties a right of private remedy, Title IX 
impliedly provides one.33 
B.  Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny  
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny was, like 
Cannon, decided in 1979.34 In Great American Federal Savings & Loan 
Assoc., the plaintiff was a man who alleged that the bank discriminated 
against him because he spoke up on behalf of his female colleagues whom 
the defendant was discriminating against.35 Novotny was a member of Great 
American Federal Savings & Loan Association’s (“the Association”) board 
of directors, a loan officer, and the Secretary for the Association after being 
with the association for twenty-five years.36  When Novotny noticed that the 
association “intentionally and deliberately embarked upon and pursued a 
course of conduct the effect of which was to deny to female employees equal 
employment opportunity,” he mentioned the discrimination during a board 
meeting.37 Immediately after this board meeting, he was fired. His 
involvement with the association ended, and he was not re-elected as 
Secretary or as a board member.38 
The plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),39 alleging that 
he had been injured as the result of the Association’s conspiring to deprive 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. Id. at 717. 
 34. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). 
 35. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1979). 
 36. Id. at 368. 
 37. Id. at 368-69. 
 38. Id. at 369. 
 39. 42 U.S. CODE § 1985(3) (2007). 
CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS (3)  
DEPRIVING PERSONS OF RIGHTS OR PRIVILEGES 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on 
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either 
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of 
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the 
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or 
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory 
the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent 
by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, 
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the 
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice 
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any 
2017] FRAMEWORK NOT FORMULA 175 
 
him of the equal protection, the equal privileges, and the immunities that 
the law provided him.40 In his complaint, he also claimed that the 
Association retaliated against him because he opposed one of their 
practices, and that their behavior fell squarely within the actions prohibited 
in § 704(4)41 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42   
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss under 42 
U.S.C. §1985(3), holding that the defendants, as directors of a single 
corporation, “could not, as a matter of law and fact, engage in a 
conspiracy.”43 On appeal, the en banc panel of three judges unanimously 
overturned the district court’s holding.44 The panel held not only that 
“conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against women fall within § 
1985(3), and that . . . a male allegedly injured as a result of such a 
conspiracy, had standing to bring suit under that statutory provision,” but 
also that “Title VII could be the source of a right asserted in an action under 
§1985(3).”45  
On review, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether an 
individual injured by another’s conspired violation of Title VII is then 
                                                                                                                                      
citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any 
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged 
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such 
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of 
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the 
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, 
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the 
conspirators. 
 40. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. at 369.  
 41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 §704 (West 2017). 
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in 
enforcement proceedings. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment 
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or 
other training or retraining, including on—the-job training programs, to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate 
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
[subchapter], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this [subchapter]. 
 42. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. at 370.  
 43. Id. at 369.  
 44. Id. at 369-70. 
 45. Id. at 370. 
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deprived of “the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws” as within the meaning of § 1985(3).46 To answer 
this question, the Court revisited a previous explanation it gave of the 
purpose of Title VII47 in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp. stating: 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., to assure equality of employment 
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . . Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected 
as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this end, 
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state 
and local employment opportunity agencies, as well as the 
Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes 
through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the 
aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.48 
The Supreme Court then analyzed Title VII’s statutory provisions and 
procedural measures, including how and when an individual should file a 
discrimination claim.49 In short, the Court reminded the parties of the strict 
time limitations and procedural requirements for claims filed under Title 
VII.50 Further, the Court stated that some of these procedural measures 
increase the possibility of “voluntary conciliation” instead of lawsuits.51 At 
that time, Title VII offered an aggrieved party only equitable relief, such as 
injunctive relief like back-pay, and the majority of federal courts did not 
permit punitive or general award damages; therefore, the Court 
reconsidered the Third Circuit’s unanimous overruling of the district 
court.52  
The Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff could assert a violation of Title 
VII through § 1985(3), he could avoid most, if not all, of the detailed and 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. at 372. 
 47. See, e.g., Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 881-84 (N.D. Ind. 1998) 
(citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)) (“[T]he primary objective of 
Title VII is not to provide redress for harassed employees, but to avoid the harm in the first 
place.”).  
 48. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. at 373 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)). 
 49. Id. at 373-75.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 374.  
 52. Id. at 374-76. 
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specific procedural and remedial provisions of Title VII such that “[t]he 
short and precise time limitations of Title VII would be grossly altered.”53 
The Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit’s judgment and remanded 
the case to be decided consistent with its opinion.54  
C.  North Haven Board of Education v. Bell  
About three years after the Supreme Court decided both Cannon and 
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., the Court considered a 
novel question regarding the scope of Title IX in North Haven Board of 
Education v. Bell.55 In North Haven Board of Education, the primary 
question considered was whether Title IX regulations extended to the 
employment practices of educational institutions.56   
 In 1978, Elaine Dove, a tenured teacher at North Haven, filed a 
complaint against the public school, alleging that her contract was not 
renewed because of sex discrimination when she returned from a one-year 
pregnancy leave.57 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(“HEW”) promptly began investigating Dove’s claim, pursuant to the 
authority given to HEW to regulate pursuant to § 902 of Title IX.58 Upon 
receiving requests for information concerning its policies on tenure, hiring, 
seniority, and leaves of absence, North Haven refused to cooperate with the 
HEW.59 Before Ms. Dove filed suit against North Haven, the school filed for 
declaratory judgment against the HEW in order to determine whether Title 
IX regulations are extended to the employment practices of educational 
institutions.60   
The district court agreed with North Haven that Title IX regulations were 
not intended to be extended to employment practices of educational 
institutions, permanently enjoined HEW from interfering with the school’s 
federal funds for noncompliance with Title IX regulations, and granted 
summary judgment to the school.61 However, the  Third Circuit reversed 
the judgment, reasoning that because the language of § 901 of Title IX was 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. at 375-76.  
 54. Id. at 378. 
 55. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677 (1979); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).  
 56. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 515-17 (1982).  
 57. Id. at 517. 
 58. Id. at 515-17. 
 59. Id. at 517. 
 60. Id. at 518. 
 61. Id.  
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inconclusive, the court must look to legislative history in order to interpret 
Congress’s intent when writing Title IX.62 In so doing, the Second Circuit 
determined that Congress did indeed intend to prohibit employment 
discrimination through the statute.63  
The Supreme Court analyzed the question by looking to the language of 
Title IX and the legislative history of the Act.64 In considering the language of 
Title IX, the Court determined that its expansive language “seem[ed] to favor 
inclusion of employees.”65 However, the Court did not end its analysis after 
considering the language of the statue because the Act does not expressly 
include employees in its scope.66 Instead, the Court turned to the legislative 
history of Title IX in order to surmise Congress’s intent.67  
The Supreme Court stated that because the only express indications of 
legislative intent for the Act came from remarks made by Senator Bayh in a 
Senate debate in 1972, his remarks were not dispositive of the legislative 
intent, but were influential in determining legislative intent.68 During the 
Senate’s debate in 1972, Senator Bayh responded to Senator Pell’s request for 
clarification as to the application of Title IX by stating that “[i]n the area of 
employment, we permit no exceptions” to discrimination.69 The Court 
interpreted the remarks made during the Senate’s debate—coupled with the 
House’s version of the Act, which had redacted a previous provision that 
had expressly excluded employment practices—to mean Congress intended 
to include employment practices.70 This holding effectively broadened the 
scope of Title IX, leading to the current circuit split as to whether Title VII’s 
strict procedural measures should preempt damages under Title IX.   
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TITLE VII AND TITLE IX  
When a statute is ambiguous, a court must look to the rules of statutory 
construction to decipher the legislative intent of the statute.71 The primary 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. N. Haven Bd. Of Educ., 456 U.S. at 519. 
 63. Id. at 519. 
 64. Id. at 520, 522. 
 65. Id. at 522. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 522. 
 68. N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 526-27. 
 69. Id. at 526. 
 70. Id. at 527-28, 530. 
 71. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. 512; see also Jack Stark, Reader Expectation 
Theory and Legislative Drafting, 17 STATUTE L. REV. 210, 214 (1996); Jack Stark, The 
Legislative Language Game, 43 FED. LAW. 39, 41 (1996). 
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rule of statutory construction is “to ascertain and give effect to the intention 
of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.”72 In order to discover the 
intention of the Legislature, a court should look to four specific indicators: 
(1) the plain language of the statute as an entire statute, (2) other statutes 
regarding the same or similar subject matter, (3) the “evils and mischiefs to 
be remedied,”73 and (4) the “natural or absurd consequences of any 
particular interpretation.”74 As a rule, a statute should be interpreted in such 
a way that reflects the plain language of the statute in the context of what it 
was designed to accomplish.75 When there is confusion as to how two 
statutes interact with one another, this framework76 should be applied to 
each statute, and then compared to one another under the same analysis.   
A.  The Statutory Construction of Title VII  
The first step in statutory construction is to examine the plain language 
of the statute.77 Since President Lyndon Johnson signed the Act fifty-two 
years ago, a “near-comprehensive web of civil rights protections against 
discrimination has been woven by Congress.”78 The plain language of Title 
VII makes two forms of employment discrimination unlawful: to either not 
hire, fire, or “otherwise . . . discriminate against”79 an individual; or to treat 
employees and potential employees in a way that “adversely affects [their] 
status”80 based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”81  
Next, the court should look to other similar statutes.82 This step is nearly 
impossible with Title VII, since it was among the first of its kind. The Civil 
Rights Act was Congress’s reaction to the social anti-discriminatory 
movement.83 Therefore, looking to other anti-discriminatory employment 
                                                                                                                                      
 72. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Thomas v. 
State, 404 P.2d 71, 73 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965)). 
 73. Anderson, 972 P.2d at 33. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110, 122 (D.R.I. 2015). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). 
 83. PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/black-culture/explore/civil-rights-leaders/” \l 
“.WEHEs6IrKqA, (last visited Aug. 29, 2017); see generally JULES ARCHER, THEY HAD A 
DREAM: THE STRUGGLES OF FOUR OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL LEADERS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
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statutes, often designed after Title VII, may prove illogical and ineffective. 
Instead, the court should move to Steps 3 and 4—looking to the “evils and 
mischiefs to be remedied”84 and the “natural or absurd consequences of any 
particular interpretation”85 in order to interpret Title VII. 
The purpose of Title VII is to “achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”86 Therefore, 
the evil and mischief to be remedied is keeping minority citizens in lower 
positions than white citizens solely because of discrimination. While 
preventing this evil and mischief is the underlying purpose of this statute, 
another purpose—as evidenced by the procedures required to file a Title 
VII claim—is to protect employers from frivolous lawsuits and prevent a 
floodgate of Title VII litigation.87 Individuals that file employment 
discrimination lawsuits under Title VII have the advantage of a powerful 
statutory weapon,88 but getting into the courtroom is a tedious process.    
Any individual bringing a claim under Title VII must adhere to 
administrative procedures according to the administration that Congress 
appointed to enforce Title VII: the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”).89 According to the EEOC, an individual or 
organization on behalf of an individual that has a claim under Title VII 
must first file a “charge of . . . discrimination”90 before filing a job 
discrimination lawsuit.91 Once that charge has been filed, the EEOC may 
encouraged mediation or send the charge to an investigator.92 If an 
investigator approves the case, the individual may then receive a “right to 
sue” notice if the case is likely to succeed and the EEOC has the authority to 
investigate it.93 With the right to sue notice, an individual may finally bring 
a job discrimination lawsuit in a court of law.  
                                                                                                                                      
MOVEMENT, FROM FREDERICK DOUGLASS TO MARCUS GARVEY TO MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. TO 
MALCOLM X (First Sky Pony Press 2016) (1993). 
 84. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1972).  
 87. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 88. See id. at 751. 
 89. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eeo_1972.html, (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2017.). 
 93. Id. 
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In addition to this process, there are timing issues that arise when an 
individual files a charge of discrimination. Before considering judicial 
timing concerns like any statutes of limitations, an individual must adhere 
to the timeliness requirements of the EEOC.94 An individual has 180 days to 
file a charge of discrimination after the discrimination occurred.95 Once 
filed, the EEOC will give the individual a copy of the filing.96 Within ten 
days, the employer will also receive a copy of the charge of discrimination.97 
If the parties choose to use mediation, the EEOC tends to settle disputes 
within three months.98 However, if the case goes to an investigator, the 
individual must wait ten months, on average, before receiving a right to sue 
notice if the case is not dismissed.99   
An individual that files an employment discrimination lawsuit under 
Title VII has the advantage of a powerful statutory weapon. Title VII affords 
plaintiffs with the possibility of two types of remedies: compensatory and 
punitive damages.100 First, a plaintiff may receive compensatory damages 
for out-of-pocket expenses the discrimination caused and for any emotional 
harm the discrimination caused.101 Second, a plaintiff may receive punitive 
damages in cases of “especially malicious or reckless” discrimination.102  
In summary, individuals that receive a right to sue notice from the EEOC 
may be encouraged that their suit has a chance of success because the EEOC 
did not dismiss it. As those individuals seek the best claims to bring before 
the court, Title VII can serve as an effective tool for restoring their 
grievances through compensatory and possibly punitive damages, 
depending on the court’s decision, the severity of the employer’s conduct, 
and the company’s size.  
The natural consequences of the procedures of Title VII have multiple 
benefits. First, its tedious requirements protect employers from frivolous 
claims and protect the courts from an inundation of unfounded Title VII 
claims. Second, Title VII helps plaintiff’s cases who pass the requirements 
because the approval of an objective party demonstrate that some form of 
                                                                                                                                      
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2017). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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discrimination likely occurred. However, the absurd consequence of 
weighing the procedural requirements of Title VII too heavily is that it 
limits a claimant’s relief through a different cause of action—namely, Title 
IX—simply because of the claimant’s inability to satisfy the procedural 
requirements of the other.  
B.  The Statutory Construction of Title IX 
The first step in statutory construction is to examine the plain 
language of the statute.103  
Next, the court should look to other statutes like the statute in question. 
However, Title IX was, like Title VII, among the first of its kind. The 
Education Amendments of 1972 was Congress’s codified reaction to the 
same Civil Rights Movement as Title VII. Therefore, looking to other anti-
discriminatory employment statutes in order to interpret one of the first 
ones may not be effective. Instead, the court should focus on Steps Three 
and Four: looking to the “evils and mischiefs to be remedied,” and the 
“natural or absurd consequences of any particular situation” in order to 
interpret Title IX. 
Because the purpose of Title IX is to prohibit sex-based discrimination in 
public education programs, the evil and mischief to be remedied is 
hindering individuals from reaching their maximum potential in a public 
education program due to sex discrimination. Title IX does not have the 
same administrative oversight as Title VII, so it is far less limited in its 
operation and scope. In fact, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 
the Supreme Court interpreted “no person” and “any educational program 
or activity” literally, holding that money damages were available for a 
student-plaintiff filing an action for sexual harassment under Title IX. This 
holding effectively broadened the scope of Title IX to allow money damages 
for student plaintiffs.104  Because the Supreme Court has held that the scope 
of Title IX is broad,105 the natural consequence is that plaintiffs would use 
Title IX whenever possible.  
                                                                                                                                      
 103. See State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Thomas v. 
State, 404 P.2d 71, 73 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965)). 
 104. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1990) rev’d, 503 
U.S. 60 (1992).  
 105. See id.; see also State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).  
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IV. EXTENDING BASIC STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE TITLE VII 
PREEMPTION OF TITLE IX 
The basic framework for statutory construction is useful when a statute is 
ambiguous in its own right. In the case of Title VII and Title IX, there is 
ambiguity regarding the remedy available for a plaintiff when the two anti-
discrimination statutes intersect on the issue of sex discrimination within 
federally funded education employment. If courts extended the use of basic 
statutory construction to analyze the ambiguity that arises from the 
interplay of two unambiguous statutes, the result would be a systematic 
form of analysis, notwithstanding the conclusions ultimately drawn in each 
case. The seminal case holding that Title VII preempts a plaintiff’s Title IX 
claims, Lakoski v. James, did not provide a framework for how the court 
arrived at its conclusion. However, a recent district court opinion analyzed 
the same issue in favor of non-preemption after setting out a clear 
framework that follows closely the basic framework for statutory 
construction.  
A.  Lakoski v. James and Winter v. Pennsylvania State University 
Procedural measures limit the scope of Title VII. In Great American 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, the Court commented that the 
“administrative process . . . plays . . . a crucial role in the scheme established 
by Congress in Title VII.”106 The procedural limits of Title VII also serve as a 
safeguard that Congress placed on a floodgate of discrimination litigation as 
well as a way to encourage mediation and “voluntary conciliation” instead of 
adjudication.107 
In Lakoski v. James, Dr. Joan Lakoski sued the University of Texas under 
Title IX108 instead of Title VII.109 Dr. Lakoski sued the University, alleging 
that the University discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. at 376. 
 107. Id. at 374. 
 108. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1681(a) (West 2017). 
 109. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998 & Supp. V 1993); see 
also Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 752 (5th Cir. 1995).  
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denied her tenure110 and suggested at trial that the University judged her by 
different standards than her male colleagues.111 The district court dismissed 
all of the claims she alleged except for the Title IX claim.112 The jury found 
in favor of Dr. Lakoski, awarding her over $250,000 in damages due to the 
University’s intentional discrimination based on her sex.113 The district 
court judge, however, decreased her award to $150,000, plus attorney’s 
fees.114  
Upon review, the Fifth Circuit reversed.115 In its 1995 opinion, the Fifth 
Circuit held that for plaintiffs whose causes of actions could fall under both 
Title VII and Title IX, Title VII provides their exclusive remedy.116 Before 
beginning its analysis, the court quipped that:  
Critical to our resolution of this case is the fact that, although 
Dr. Lakoski possessed a colorable claim of employment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII, she chose not to pursue 
the remedy made available by Title VII. Title VII provides an 
administrative procedure in which an aggrieved individual must 
first pursue administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. 
Dr. Lakoski chose to circumvent this procedure and immediately 
assert her rights under Title IX both directly and derivatively 
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.117 
The subsequent analysis of the case hangs under the shadow of this stern 
statement; it is no surprise that the court ruled against the plaintiff.  
1.  Lakoski v. James Analysis as Compared to Basic Statutory 
Construction  
The Court refused Lakoski’s assertion that Title IX offered her a right of 
private action for damages for employment discrimination.118  The court 
distinguished Lakoski’s case from precedent in Cannon, Bell, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 110. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751(5th Cir. 1995).  
 111. Id. at 753. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 758.  
 116. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 758. 
 117. Id. at 753 (internal citation omitted). 
 118. Id. at 754. 
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Franklin,119 because the plaintiffs in those cases did not have the dual option 
of using Title VII or Title IX as Lakoski did.120 Next, the court pointed out 
that the record indicated that the district court erred in submitting to the 
jury both Lakoski’s Title IX and § 1983 claim.121 Finally, the court 
considered the congressional intent of Title IX to determine if Lakoski’s 
claim for a private right of action for employment discrimination was valid 
under the Act.122 The Fifth Circuit held that “Congress intended Title VII to 
exclude a damage remedy under Title IX for individuals alleging 
employment discrimination.”123  
The First Circuit’s rationale focused on congressional intent. First, the 
court asserted that “Congress chose a variety of tools to remedy 
employment discrimination.”124 It noted that Title IX “is part of a larger 
federal legislative scheme designed to protect individuals from employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex”;125 Title IX and Title VII are separate 
tools used to accomplish the same larger purpose, not separate tools to be 
used to accomplish the same, narrow purpose.126 Second, the court 
emphasized that the administrative oversight and the tedious procedure 
required to file a Title VII act are crucial to how Congress designed Title 
VII’s statutory scheme.127 Thus, the court reasoned that for a plaintiff to be 
able to circumvent the administrative process of the Act by simply filing 
under Title IX was not Congress’s intent for either of the statutes.128   
The Lakoski court followed Steps One through Three of the basic 
statutory construction framework, as demonstrated in Anderson, for 
discovering the intention of the Legislature.129 That is, the Lakoski court 
considered the plain language of the statutes as a whole,130 other anti-
                                                                                                                                      
 119. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that money 
damages were available for a student-plaintiff filing an action for sexual harassment under 
Title IX and began the broadening of the scope of Title IX); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 
U.S. 512 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 120. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 755. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 757 (stating that “Congress chose two remedies for the same 
right, not two rights addressing the same problem”).  
 127. Id. at 755. 
 128. Id. at 756. 
 129. See supra Section III.B. 
 130. See State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).  
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discriminatory statutes regarding the similar subject matter,131 and the “evils 
and mischiefs to be remedied.”132  
In fact, given the court’s preliminary remarks,133 it would seem that it 
focused most heavily on the mischief to be remedied. The court labored 
over the plaintiff’s decision to “circumvent . . . procedure,”134 disagreeing 
with her “jurisprudential arithmetic,”135 and her “beguilingly simple 
syllogism that [the decisions in] Cannon, Bell, and Franklin”136 all led to a 
private right of action under Title IX. Further, the court was “unwilling to 
do such violence to the congressionally mandated procedures,”137 ruling 
that Title VII claims preempted Title IX claims in employment sex 
discrimination cases.     
However, the court failed to examine Step Four. The Lakoski court did 
not look to the “natural or absurd consequences of any particular 
interpretation.”138 Focused on eliminating the perceived mischief of a 
plaintiff circumventing important procedural steps, the court did not 
consider the absurd result of denying a plaintiff a remedy by using one anti-
discrimination statute to foreclose her opportunity of a remedy under 
another. The Lakoski court is an example of the current difficulty facing a 
plaintiff in a jurisdiction that preempts Title IX claims with Title VII.  
When the statutes intersect, the plaintiff may sue the employer under 
both statutes or choose only one, depending on the jurisdiction. The Fifth 
Circuit does not allow a plaintiff that has failed to meet the Title VII 
procedural measures to subsequently file a complaint under Title IX. 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit requires a claimant to choose strategically, using 
the reasoning from the Lakoski court.139 However, the Fourth Circuit allows 
a plaintiff to file complaints under both statutes such that the plaintiff may 
seek relief to the fullest extent under each statute. The following recent case 
exemplifies the proper reasoning under a basic framework for statutory 
construction that a court should use to uncover legislative intent.  
                                                                                                                                      
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 754.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).  
 139. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751.  
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In Winter v. Pennsylvania State University, plaintiff Dr. Thomas Winter 
was a tenured professor at the Wilkes-Barre campus for thirty-eight years.140 
The tenure policy at Penn State provided that once a professor became 
tenured, he could only be fired for “grave misconduct.”141 When Dr. Winter 
was terminated in late November 2014 for “the adequate cause of grave 
misconduct effective immediately,”142 Dr. Winter filed a lawsuit against the 
university and eleven of its employees for violating his rights under federal 
law.143 
In March 2014, Dr. Winter alleged that two of the included Penn State 
employee-defendants, the Director of Academic Affairs and the Vice 
Provost for Affirmative Action and Title IX Coordinator, conducted an 
“ambush interview” of him.144 According to Dr. Winter, the Director of 
Academic Affairs lured him into a meeting by emailing that they needed to 
meet with him the following day about an “academic matter.”145 When Dr. 
Winter arrived to the meeting, the Director of Academic Affairs left 
immediately, leaving Dr. Winter alone with the Vice Provost for 
Affirmative Action and Title IX Coordinator.146 The “ambush interview” 
then proceeded, wherein the Vice Provost for Affirmative Action and Title 
IX Coordinator informed Dr. Winter about a sexual harassment complaint 
that had been filed against him on behalf of a twenty-one-year-old 
undergraduate student, J.T.147 In the email that called Dr. Winter to the 
meeting, there had been no warning that the meeting was regarding a sexual 
harassment complaint.148 Furthermore, Dr. Winter did not see a copy of the 
complaint, and there was no follow-up meeting before the matter was 
investigated and termination proceedings began.149 
The Vice Provost’s investigation of Dr. Winter occurred concurrently 
with other Title IX complaints against Penn State.150 Specifically, the U.S. 
Department of Education was in the process of investigating the university 
                                                                                                                                      
 140. Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 761 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 762.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 762. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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for the way it handled sexual misconduct complaints.151 After the 
appropriate reports had been filed, Dr. Winter’s termination hearings began 
in September 2014.152 According to the plaintiff, the judge allowed hearsay 
and double-hearsay testimony over the objection of Dr. Winter’s counsel.153 
In addition, the four-member panel at the hearing allowed two officials that 
out-ranked all of the members of the panel to testify against Dr. Winter 
despite their lack of personal knowledge about what transpired between Dr. 
Winter and J.T.154 Dr. Winter alleged that these officials’ testimony that he 
had been “grooming” J.T. had a “highly inflammatory effect” in light of 
Penn State’s former assistant football coach, Jerry Sandusky’s child abuse 
scandal.155  
Shortly after the hearings, the President of Penn State terminated Dr. 
Winter for “grave misconduct”156 because of Dr. Winter’s two comments 
about J.T.’s appearance, one “hug” with her after one such comment, and a 
questionable off-campus lunch to “discuss her independent study” that was 
followed by five more invitations to lunch that J.T. refused, telling Dr. 
Winter of her discomfort with his compliments on her appearance and 
personality.157 Dr. Winter then filed this lawsuit against the university, 
alleging a violation of his substantive and due process rights, sex 
discrimination under Title IX, and breach of contract.158 In short, Dr. 
Winter’s discrimination allegation rested on his belief that due to the recent 
Jerry Sandusky scandal, the defendants lacked “the impartiality necessary to 
provide [him] with a fair investigation”159 because “Defendants were 
motivated by a desire to ‘improve their standing with the Department of 
Education’ and to ‘avoid further public criticism.’”160  
Regarding Dr. Winter’s Title IX claim, the university sought to dismiss 
this claim based on Title VII preemption as well as insufficient facts to 
support the allegation that Penn State University discriminated against Dr. 
Winter because of his sex.161 Dr. Winter responded that the Third Circuit 
                                                                                                                                      
 151. Id. 
 152. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 762.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 762-63. 
 155. Id. at 763. 
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 157. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 763. 
 158. Id. at 765. 
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recognized that Title VII does not preempt Title IX and that he had indeed 
pled a violation of Title IX.162 The United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed this count first by thoroughly 
addressing the issue of Title VII preemption of Title IX with respect to 
other courts, reading previous Supreme Court opinions regarding each 
statute together, and looking to the congressional intent regarding Title VII 
in relation to other statutes.163 While addressing each of these matters, the 
Winter court fulfilled each step of basic statutory construction. 
2. Winter v. Pennsylvania Analysis as Compared to Basic Statutory 
Construction 
In Winter v. Pennsylvania, the court began its analysis by linking the 
holdings of the three Supreme Court opinions to create the following rule: 
plaintiff-victims, whether students or employees,164 of sex discrimination by 
a university that directly benefits from federal funding have a private cause 
of action165 for which money damages are available.166 This combined, literal 
reading of the holdings and principles in Cannon, Bell, and Franklin leaves 
no room for Title VII to preempt Title IX.  
Next, the court rationalized its reading of these holdings by looking to 
Congress’s intent when creating the two statutes.167 The court mentioned 
the defendants’ arguments that “the comprehensive administrative scheme 
underlying Title VII suggests that it is the exclusive remedy for employment 
discrimination”168 and “that Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to 
circumvent this scheme by filing claims pursuant to Title IX.”169 Rebuking 
both arguments, the court referred to a 1975 case in which the Supreme 
Court explained the legislative history of Title VII, stating that “[d]espite 
Title VII’s range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem 
                                                                                                                                      
 162. Id.  
 163. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 773.  
 164. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 773-74 (citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 
520 (1982)) (stating that “[e]mployees who directly participate in federal programs or who 
directly benefit from federal grants, loans or contracts” also have a claim under Title IX).  
 165. Id. at 773 (referring to Cannon’s holding that there is an implied private cause of 
action for victims of sex discrimination by universities receiving federal funding); see also 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703-10 (1979). 
 166. Id. at 774 (referring to Franklin’s holding that money damages were available to 
student-plaintiffs under a sexual harassment action under Title IX); see also Franklin v. 
Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992)). 
 167. Id. at 775. 
 168. Id. (citing Johnson v. Ry Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975)). 
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of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly 
is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII 
in search for relief.”170 Instead, “[t]he legislative history of Title VII 
manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue 
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable . . . 
federal statutes.”171  
Further, the court quoted a 1971 House of Representative hearing that 
stated that the remedies available under a Title VII claim are “co-extensive 
with the individual’s right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act . . . and that the two procedures augmented each other”172 instead of 
mutually excluding each other. Accordingly, the Winter court conclusively 
decided to oppose the notion that Title VII preempts Title IX. Thus, in 
careful consideration of legislative intent, the Winter court examined the 
“natural or absurd consequences” of the particular situation of foreclosing a 
plaintiff’s gender-based discrimination claim through Title IX by 
preempting it with a statute specifically designed to reduce discrimination 
against women (among others) in the workplace.173  
B. The Natural or Absurd Consequences of Favoring Preemption: Littlejohn 
v. City of New York 
This circuit split as to whether Title VII preempts damages that could be 
acquired under Title IX has a strong effect on defendant-employers as well 
as plaintiff-employees. First, in order to receive fair adjudication—that is, 
without receiving a windfall or being short-changed—plaintiffs should have 
certainty about the damages available to them in order to pursue the best 
case against their employer. Second, in order to provide proper training and 
to effectively prevent costly litigation, defendant-employers deserve to have 
certainty about the consequences that a discrimination action can have on 
them.  
In Littlejohn v. City of New York, a female employee filed suit against her 
former employer for sexual harassment as well as racial discrimination. The 
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff employee’s sexual harassment claim 
was not reasonably related to claims in her Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) complaint, which alleged racial discrimination. 
Although the plaintiff had attempted to amend her EEOC complaint by 
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submitting an unsworn letter to the district administration office, the letters 
did not effectively add her sexual harassment claim to the existing EEOC 
claim. The court asserted that it has “made clear that unsworn letters sent to 
the EEOC describing additional claims of discrimination unrelated to the 
claims described in the EEOC charge cannot “enlarge [the] scope [of the 
original charge] to include new claims.”174 Consequently, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of her sexual harassment 
claim.  
Littlejohn did not follow the procedural requirements of her 
Title VII claim and was therefore precluded from bringing both a 
sexual harassment and racial discrimination claim. According to 
the court, “Littlejohn could have filed a separate charge with the 
EEOC alleging an additional basis of discrimination within the 
appropriate limitations period, but she could not amend prior 
unrelated charges to add this additional basis simply by sending 
Berry an unsworn letter.”175 The sexual harassment claim 
Littlejohn sought to add could not be tacked onto a separate, 
original claim with the EEOC, even though both claims shared 
the same facts and circumstances. In short, Littlejohn is a good 
example of how one procedural misstep can unravel a plaintiff’s 
claim and foreclose her opportunity for a legal remedy in 
jurisdictions that favor preemption. As discrimination becomes 
more difficult to detect in the employment sphere, is it fair to 
measure the merit of a Title IX claim on the tedious procedural 
measures of Title VII?  
V. THE BENEFITS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT FAVORS NON-
PREEMPTION 
Title VII and Title IX have dramatically impacted sex-discrimination in 
the workplace. Each statute was a product of impactful acts that sought to 
end discrimination and give previously disadvantaged groups more 
economic opportunity. The effects of the Civil Rights Act and the Education 
Amendments Act have not only revolutionized employment, but also have 
immensely impacted American society and economics. The impact these 
Acts have made on the American workplace and lifestyle are congruous 
with the legislative intent behind them. Both Acts provide a safeguard 
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against sexual discrimination. The positive impact of refusing to tolerate 
sexual discrimination in the workplace is a compelling reason why courts 
should favor non-preemption of Title IX by Title VII. 
A.  The Effects of the Civil Rights Act in Employment: How Title VII 
Changed the Face of the American Workplace 
The effects of the Civil Rights Act in employment in the United States are 
vast. Three specific changes that the Civil Rights Act brought to the 
American workforce have radically altered the way the workplace operates 
and the makeup of the American workplace. First, the private sector has 
followed the lead of the government with respect to anti-discriminatory 
practices. Now, the American workplace as a whole offers equal 
opportunity employment.176 Second, women now hold far more jobs than 
before enactment of the Civil Rights Act, including executive positions in 
large companies and other white-collar jobs.177 Finally, with a clear standard 
against discrimination in the workplace, much of today’s discrimination in 
the workplace is subtle.178 
The private sector did not tarry in offering the same anti-discriminatory 
protections that the public sector was required to offer.179 Although many 
individuals in the United States hesitated to adopt the rationale behind the 
Civil Rights Act, many private companies soon realized the invaluable 
benefit to a diverse workforce.180 According to Nicole Butts, an expert who 
trains Human Resources professionals, “[d]iversity in the workforce today 
is a financial issue.”181 Quite simply, she believes that the best way to serve 
customers requires relating to customers.182 Therefore, if a customer base is 
diverse, she believes that employees should also be diverse so that the 
company can relate to the needs of its customers.183 John Lewis, chief 
diversity officer at Coca-Cola, stated that “[t]he more diverse a room when 
decisions are made, the better the decisions.”184  
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While companies see the necessity of a diverse workforce for many 
reasons, including social equality and legal liability, the most important is 
that money talks.185 Private companies’ products and services are far more 
competitive when the workforce designing and marketing their products 
and services represents the marketplace.186 New perspectives from female 
and minority employees revolutionized American businesses by reaching 
more audiences more effectively within the marketplace.187  
According to Jocelyn Frye, a senior fellow at a Washington D.C. think 
tank, women represented almost fifty percent of the U.S. civilian workforce, 
as recently as 2014.188 In 1967, only four years after the Civil Rights Act was 
passed, women represented about twenty-nine percent of the civilian 
workforce.189 Thus, in thirty-six years, one protected group under the Act 
has increased its participation in the workforce by almost twenty percent.190 
Judging by numbers alone, women have benefited most from the 
protections that the Civil Rights Act provided.191 The effect of having more 
women in the workforce has altered the way that businesses operate because 
women tend to bring two distinct qualities to the table: interpersonal-
relationship skills and multi-tasking.192  
Companies that are hiring more women and underscoring the female 
perspective do so for reasons beyond idealism and altruism—women add to 
economic growth.193 According to a 2015 study released by McKinsey & 
Company, if women globally were afforded the opportunity to reach their 
economic potential, “$28 trillion could be added to the GDP by 2025.”194 
The Civil Rights Act has helped give women an opportunity to pursue 
successful careers and provide for their families while revolutionizing the 
marketplace and the workplace.195  
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Finally, another effect of the Civil Rights Act is that much of today’s 
discrimination in the workplace is no longer overt.196 Before Title VII was 
passed, employers were free to name the race, gender, or religion of 
applicants that they would accept.197 Especially in regions of the country 
that were historically prejudiced against African Americans, these practices 
limited men and women in their ability to pursue meaningful work, provide 
for their families, and build the life they desired.198 For example, it was not 
rare for a young black man like the former head of the Martin Luther King, 
Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, Mr. William Walker, to travel 
from the segregated South to the North in the 1950s just to find summer 
work.199  
By defining a clear standard for employer behavior, Title VII has 
changed the way discrimination occurs in the workplace.200 Today, most 
discrimination cases in employment law do not have a “smoking gun” that 
points to obvious discrimination;201 it is often difficult to prove when 
employers discriminate in violation of Title VII, because the days of social 
acceptance of open discrimination based on sex, race, or religion are 
virtually no more.202 Several important factors that employment lawyers 
consider to detect discrimination are how “similarly situated employees are 
treated,”203 any “smoking gun”204 comments, and statistics that demonstrate 
a pattern of bias toward one group or against a protected group.205  
Over the last fifty years, Title VII claims have shifted from lawsuits 
against employers for not hiring employees to lawsuits against employers 
for not fairly promoting, or for unfairly terminating employees.206 This 
development highlights two facts: (1) employers in the United States have 
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progressed since Title VII was passed by giving Americans employment 
opportunities, and (2) a “super statute” such as Title VII can promote social 
change, but it will not eradicate social inequality.  
Thus, while the Civil Rights Act and Title VII have not completely 
eliminated discrimination in the workplace, they have greatly impacted 
American employment by setting a clear standard against open 
discrimination of individuals based on gender, race, or religion.207 Title VII 
promoted anti-discrimination shifts in the private sector through its 
standard for the public sector, increased the female influence in the 
marketplace and in the workplace, and set the bar higher for employer 
standards of conduct toward minority employees.208 In only fifty years, Title 
VII has revolutionized the American marketplace and social climate 
regarding discrimination in the workplace.209  
B. The Effect of the Education Amendment Act of 1972: More Than Title 
IX: How Equity in Education Has Shaped the Nation 
Just as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 changed the face of employment in 
the United States, Title IX has altered education in the U.S., as men and 
women alike have pursued different career paths not formerly available to 
them.210 For example, before Title IX was passed, most colleges had a set 
quota for the number of women they admitted. Also, many classified ads for 
jobs described the gender required for any applicants, and employers were 
permitted to pay women less money to do the same job as men.211 Although 
Title IX did not “single-handedly[] transform our society, it was—and 
remains—one of the most comprehensive and effective mechanisms for 
social change”212 in America. For example, in the early seventies, married 
women could not get lines of credit in their names, and men were not 
allowed to attend the birth of their children in the nursery ward.213 
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Education, the great equalizer, has the power to change the trajectory of a 
life through the opportunities it affords.214 It is no surprise that Title IX, a 
super statute that encourages equality in education, has altered the social 
perspective of the nation for many of the same reasons that Title VII has 
revolutionized employment. Today, women are the majority of 
undergraduates in universities and colleges, and mothers’ hours of paid 
work has tripled since 1965.215 While women have benefited greatly from 
Title IX, men have also been granted liberties to pursue careers not 
traditionally considered for men. For example, men now pursue careers as 
nurses and elementary school teachers, whereas in the sixties and seventies 
such careers were not considered suitable for men.216 
After more than forty years since it has been passed, Title IX’s effect on 
education and the U.S. economy is astounding. Title IX opened doors for 
women in education to participate more freely in the marketplace in various 
ways, including as doctors, dentists, executives, and work-from-home full-
time mothers.217 While traditional roles218 for women emphasized the 
importance of a strong, stable family unit in America, the stereotypes of 
those roles often limited or minimized their opportunities to achieve 
academic, intellectual, and career potentials.219 Title IX allowed women to 
cultivate and encourage their educational desires, while also encouraging 
men and women alike to choose careers that suit their skill sets and life 
goals, regardless of traditional gender roles assigned to a particular career.220 
The social and economic effect of Title VII and Title IX on the American 
workplace is a colossal tribute to the American Dream and honors the 
liberty this great nation was founded upon.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a necessary change in 
response to a tumultuous time in American politics and social policy. The 
Act, along with many anti-discrimination statutes that followed shortly 
thereafter, has “penetrate[d] deeply into American norms [and] 
institutional practice” such that it has “successfully penetrate[d] public 
normative and institutional culture in a deep way.”221 Because of the 
magnitude of social importance that both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Higher Education Act of 1972 brought, uncertainty about how they 
interact with one another can carry strong social implications.  
By using careful statutory construction to interpret how Title VII and 
Title IX should affect one another, it appears absurd that when two anti-
discriminatory statutes apply to the same claim, the inability to qualify for 
the tedious administrative measures of one statute would result in a 
plaintiff’s forfeiture of the other claim. Further, a literal collective reading of 
Supreme Court decisions on the issue disfavors the argument that Title 
VIII’s procedural requirements should determine a plaintiff’s use of Title IX 
in the alternative.  
A Supreme Court decision settling this circuit split in favor of 
eliminating Title VII’s preemption of Title IX when a plaintiff has failed to 
fulfill the procedural measurements of Title VII would be justified. 
Furthermore, it would also assert that where sex discrimination in federally 
funded education programs are concerned, the United States does not put 
the importance of procedural measures above a claimant’s ability to have 
her day in court. Until a Supreme Court resolution to the circuit split 
occurs, circuit courts should utilize a systematic, disciplined approach to 
resolving ambiguities that arise from the interplay between Title VII and 
Title IX. In so doing, the courts would demonstrate that the issue of sex 
discrimination in federally funded education programs is a matter to be 
given the attention of careful, contemplative analysis instead of a mere 
balancing of important interests.  
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